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1. Introduction 
The contemporary debate over responsibility for belief is divided over the issue of 
whether such responsibility requires doxastic control, and whether this control must be 
voluntary in nature.1 It has recently become popular to hold that responsibility for belief does 
not require voluntary doxastic control, or perhaps even any form of doxastic “control” at all.2 
We can be responsible for our doxastic attitudes, some have argued, even though such 
attitudes are in some sense non-agential,3 or at least, are not subject to any form of direct or 
voluntary control. In this respect, responsibility for belief seems (to some) importantly 
different from responsibility for action, the latter of which appears to essentially involve 
direct, voluntary control.  
However, Miriam McCormick (2011, 2015) has recently argued that doxastic 
responsibility does in fact require (quasi-voluntary) doxastic control, and that our beliefs are 
the products of our agency, in much the same way that our actions are. She argues that the 
doxastic control we exercise, which grounds responsibility for belief, is a form of “guidance 
control.” Guidance control is a compatibilist form of control that does not entail that one could 
have done (or believed) otherwise. It is an essentially diachronic, temporally-extended form 
of control that is bound up with how one sees oneself and how one is seen by others. 
Understanding doxastic responsibility as grounded in guidance control, McCormick argues, 
avoids a number of issues encountered by other accounts of doxastic responsibility, such as 
accounts that see responsibility for belief as grounded (only) in reasons-responsiveness or in 
one’s character.  
In this paper, I pursue a negative and a positive task. In the first part of the paper, I 
will argue that McCormick’s account of doxastic responsibility in terms of guidance control 
faces serious difficulties. In particular, I will argue that grounding doxastic responsibility in 
guidance control requires too much for agents to be the proper targets for attributions of 
doxastic responsibility. I will focus my criticisms on three cases in which McCormick’s 
account gives the intuitively wrong verdict. I will suggest that agents can be appropriately 
held responsible for their beliefs while failing to meet the conditions required for guidance 
control. If so, doxastic guidance control does not ground responsibility for belief.  
After criticizing McCormick’s account of doxastic responsibility, I will move on to 
the second part of the paper, in which I offer my own positive account. In particular, I 
develop a modified conception of McCormick’s notion of “ownership of belief,” which I 
                                               
1 In fact, as Weatherson (2008) nicely points out, there appears to be some confusion or conflation between the 
voluntary and the volitional when it comes to debates about control. Many things are voluntary that are not 
volitional, and the fact that belief is not subject to volitional control (i.e., we do not form or control our beliefs 
by forming and executing intentions) does not show that they are not voluntary or subject to voluntary control. 
Weatherson attributes this original confusion to Alston (1988), at least with regard to doxastic control. 
2 See Heller (2000), Hieronymi (2006, 2008), McHugh (2017, 2014, 2013), Peels (2017), and Smith (2005, 2008). 
3 See, e.g., Chrisman (2008). 
  
Forthcoming in Episteme                        2 
call Weak Doxastic Ownership. I employ this conception to argue that responsibility for belief 
is possible even in the absence of guidance control. In doing so, I argue that the notion of 
doxastic ownership can do important normative work in grounding responsibility for belief 
without being subsumed under or analyzed in terms of the notion of doxastic control. 
 
2. Background: Guidance Control and Doxastic Responsibility 
McCormick borrows the general notion and central parts of the theory of “guidance 
control” from Fischer and Ravizza (1998), and extends their account into the doxastic realm. 
I will be concerned in this paper with only McCormick’s own presentation and use of the 
notion, and thus will not concern myself with how (if at all) it diverges from Fischer and 
Ravizza’s. As McCormick employs it, there are two components of guidance control: (a) 
reasons-responsiveness, and (b) ownership. An agent exhibits guidance control over an attitude, 
such as a belief, when that attitude is the product (the “upshot”) of a historically reasons-
responsive process or mechanism, which the agent correctly recognizes as her own, and 
thereby “takes ownership” of the mechanism and its products, e.g., her beliefs.  
A mechanism or process is reasons-responsive, in the relevant sense, if it involves 
the capacity to respond to various considerations as reasons, e.g., to respond to evidential 
considerations as epistemic reasons. An agent is reasons-responsive in the manner required 
for guidance control, on McCormick’s account, if she employs a mechanism or process that 
is itself reasons-responsive, and is able to “guide” her belief-formation and revision in 
response to considerations that she understands as reasons.4 This “guidance” centrally 
involves keeping one’s beliefs in line with one’s own higher-order judgments about what one 
ought to believe.5 
The notion of “ownership,” being the second condition for guidance control, is 
somewhat more difficult. Taking ownership of a belief involves regarding it as ‘one’s own’, 
which in turn involves taking responsibility for it, and for the mechanism or process that 
produced it. The notion of “taking responsibility” here is understood developmentally and 
historically. McCormick (2015, pg. 112) describes it in the following way: 
 
Taking responsibility is understood historically. As one comes to view oneself as an 
agent--as having an effect on the world as a consequence of one’s intentions, 
decisions, etc.--one comes to view oneself as a fair target for the reactive attitudes, 
such as being worthy of blame or praise. By viewing oneself as an appropriate target 
for the consequence of a particular mechanism (say, ordinary practical reasoning), 
one thereby takes responsibility for it and the behavior resulting from it. Once one 
                                               
4 McCormick adopts the distinction between the reasons-responsiveness of mechanisms/processes and that of 
agents from Fischer and Ravizza. The distinction is not central to my project here, but it is still worth noting. 
The distinction, among other things, is meant to allow for the possibility that a mechanism or process might 
remain reasons-responsive even when an agent as a whole is not, e.g., when she fails to employ the mechanism 
appropriately. For the purposes of this paper, I will be talking about the reasons-responsiveness of agents 
unless otherwise noted.  
5 Presumably McCormick means this dispositionally. That is, if one believed that p, and one were (disposed) to judge 
that one ought not believe that p, where this judgment would be sustained through reflection or deliberation, 
one would give up or take steps to revise one’s belief that p. This is similar in important respects to what Angela 
Smith (e.g., 2015a) refers to as the “judgment sensitivity” of attitudes.  
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takes responsibility for a particular mechanism, then this ownership extends to future 
operations of the mechanism. It is a process that occurs over time where we develop 
a concept of ourselves as engaged in a kind of conversation. 
 
It is important to note, as McCormick herself emphasizes elsewhere, that taking 
responsibility for one’s beliefs need not be or involve an explicit, conscious act. Rather, the 
fact that one has taken responsibility can be revealed by one’s general behavior and one’s 
other attitudes. In particular, McCormick says, “Even if we never consciously endorse a 
mechanism, we can still have ownership of it. [...] I have taken responsibility if my practices 
reveal that I have accepted the expectation that I keep my beliefs of this kind in line with my 
higher order judgments of how I ought to believe.”6 
McCormick appears to be working with something like what some have called the 
answerability model of responsibility, which attempts to combine core features of the 
accountability and attributability models.7 The features of the latter two models that answerability 
attempts to synthesize, and which McCormick appears to think are both important, are the 
second-personal structure involved in holding someone accountable to a demand or 
expectation, as well as the notion that things for which we are responsible must reflect our 
evaluative judgments or be products of our agency. McCormick is concerned with 
attributability via the notion of “ownership” of belief, while she appears concerned with 
accountability via her focus on the reactive attitudes, which are often understood as ways of 
holding others accountable to demands or expectations.8 So, like the answerability model, her 
account attempts to combine these two features with respect to doxastic responsibility. Thus, 
for the purposes of this paper, I will follow McCormick in thinking of responsibility in terms 
of answerability in this sense, where being answerable is ultimately supposed to involve being 
the proper target of a demand for reasons or justification for one’s belief (or other attitude).9   
So McCormick’s general picture is this: doxastic responsibility is grounded in a form 
of doxastic agency that is centrally defined by the capacity for guidance control. Guidance 
control over one’s doxastic attitudes necessarily entails (a) that the attitudes are the products 
of a reasons-responsive mechanism or process, and (b) that one recognizes the mechanism 
or process as one’s own, takes ownership of it, and take responsibility for its products. 
Whether or not the reactive attitudes are appropriately directed at an agent in virtue of her 
doxastic attitudes will be determined by the extent to which that agent exercised or had the 
capacity for guidance control over the attitude in question. 
 
3. Problems for Guidance Control as a Requirement on Doxastic Responsibility 
 I will now argue that McCormick’s account requires too much for agents to be the 
proper targets for attributions of doxastic responsibility. I will do so via consideration of 
three cases in which an agent fails to satisfy the ownership condition on guidance control, 
                                               
6 McCormick (2015, pg. 121). 
7 E.g., see Angela Smith (2012, 2015b).  
8 For a version of the latter kind of account (of the reactive attitudes), see Wallace (1994).  
9 This is importantly distinct from the conception of doxastic responsibility as responsibility for having influenced 
or brought one’s beliefs about in such-and-such way.  
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and yet in principle still appears to be an appropriate subject of doxastic responsibility. Each 
case will represent a structurally different way in which one might fail to satisfy the 
ownership condition. 
3.1. Case 1: Replicated Beliefs 
The first way that one can fail to satisfy the ownership condition on guidance control 
and nevertheless still be the appropriate subject of doxastic responsibility is by having one’s 
beliefs produced by a mechanism other than that which one has (historically) taken 
responsibility for and recognizes as one’s own. Remember that for guidance control, one 
must not only take responsibility for one’s beliefs, but also for the mechanism or process of 
which they are “upshots.” But consider the following case: 
 
Replicated Beliefs: Jane has a degenerative brain disease that causes her to 
gradually lose her beliefs, in the same way that other conditions cause one to lose 
one’s memories. The disease does not, however, affect her other cognitive or 
executive capacities. Jane’s brother John, a brilliant computer scientist, designs a 
computer program that makes exact virtual copies of her beliefs each morning, and 
replaces any beliefs that she has lost at night while she sleeps, though Jane is unaware 
of this. Eventually, all of Jane’s beliefs have been replaced with copies generated by 
the computer program. Nevertheless, Jane still experiences those beliefs as her own, 
endorses them, and they still reflect and are grounded in her judgments and values.10 
 
Once enough time has passed, none of Jane’s beliefs are products of a mechanism or 
process that she has taken responsibility for or identifies as her own. So she fails to satisfy 
the ownership condition on guidance control, and thus McCormick’s account would tell us 
that she cannot be appropriately held responsible for any of her beliefs. But if we grant that 
Jane’s case is possible, then it seems plausible to suppose that Jane could be appropriately 
held responsible for her beliefs even though she lacks guidance control. So it is possible in 
principle for one’s beliefs to be produced by a mechanism other than ‘one’s own’ and for 
one to still be appropriately held responsible for them.11 
3.2. Case 2: Doxastic Swampman 
 The second way that one can fail to satisfy the ownership condition on guidance 
control is by lacking the right kind of socio-causal history. Consider the following case: 
 
Doxastic Swampman: Imagine that a being, Swampman, spontaneously comes into 
being out of the churning sludge of a swamp. Swampman has a full complement of 
cognitive abilities, i.e., is capable of reasoning, language, belief-formation and 
revision, etc. And imagine that Swampman immediately goes ahead and starts 
forming and professing beliefs about the world, most true, but some false. And 
imagine that a group of regular old human agents are there to witness all this. They 
start conversing with Swampman, who is fully able to interact linguistically with 
                                               
10 I’m inclined to think this case is in fact not so far fetched. It seems like the kind of thing that might soon be 
possible with cutting-edge computer and medical technology. So it may very well be the kind of thing that will 
be relevant to ‘real life’ in the next decade or two.  
11 Remember that ‘appropriately held responsible for’ here means ‘appropriately held answerable to a demand for 
reasons’. 
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them, and appears to understand how his perceptual faculties are related to his 
belief-forming and linguistic mechanisms.12 
 
Once the shock of what they have witnessed wears off, and the humans seem confident that 
Swampman is a doxastic agent, would they be in a position to properly hold him responsible, 
i.e., answerable? One might have worries here about whether Swampman’s could even have 
beliefs at all. For example, given that he has no causal history, one might doubt that his 
mental states could have intelligible content, or could bear reference to singular entities or 
even natural kinds, since Swampman has never been in causal contact with those entities or 
kinds. 
One way to address this worry is to imagine that Swampman could at least have 
beliefs with intelligible a priori (e.g., moral) content. For beliefs with a priori (or perhaps 
purely conceptual) content, the lack of a casual history is less clearly a problem. 
McCormick’s account tells us that, because Swampman has no developmental history 
whereby he came to see himself as the proper target of the reactive attitudes, he cannot 
possibly be appropriately held responsible for any his beliefs. But imagine that Swampman 
quickly forms and professes the belief that the humans are inferior to him and should serve 
him as their master. He is adamant about this belief and insists he is correct, though he takes 
no objectionable or violent action against them. Would he not be the appropriate target of 
blame, resentment, indignation, etc. in virtue of this belief? Could he not be appropriately 
held answerable for this belief, at least in principle?  
 This is a rather fantastic case, and I do not mean to suggest that what should be said 
about it is extremely clear. One might have no clear intuitions at all. But even if Swampman 
is not appropriately held responsible, the fact that he has no social-developmental history of 
the relevant kind might seem to be rather far down on our list of worries about him with 
respect to whether or not he is responsible for his beliefs. Presumably our most serious 
worry is simply whether Swampman really understands what he’s saying, doing, and thinking. 
However, if we were somehow convinced that Swampman really did understand what he was 
saying, doing, and thinking, it doesn’t seem beyond the pale to think that he would still be 
the appropriate target for attributions of doxastic responsibility. His lack of a developmental 
history, in particular a history of taking responsibility for his beliefs, does not appear to 
exempt him in principle from being appropriately held responsible for his beliefs--though of 
course other things might.  
3.3. Case 3: Isolated Society 
The third way that one can fail to satisfy the ownership condition on guidance 
control is by not belonging to a community that engages in the relevant practices of 
epistemic evaluation. Consider the following case: 
                                               
12 Of course, the point of Davidson’s original Swampman case was that Swampman had no beliefs, since 
mental content is (he argued) dependent on its causal history. It is clearly beyond the scope of this paper to 
argue against Davidson’s account of mental content, but it is nonetheless important to note that this 
Swampman case I’ve offered diverges sharply from the original intent of the case, and in fact depends expressly 
on the falsity of Davidson’s own view about the case. 
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Isolated Society: Imagine that we discover and make contact with a previously 
unknown and isolated human society, and are able to engage in linguistic 
communication with them. This society has no discernable social practice of taking 
ownership or responsibility for their beliefs, and no practice of doxastic appraisal, 
though they do certainly seem to have beliefs. While they do appear to employ 
certain evaluative practices, none of these practices seem to involve taking or 
attributing responsibility for belief. 
 
If such a society is conceivable, which it certainly seems to be, McCormick’s account would 
tell us that no members of that society would ever be appropriate targets for attributions of 
doxastic responsibility, unless they somehow came to adopt practices of taking ownership 
and responsibility for belief. Otherwise, all members of such a society would in principle be 
systematically exempted from doxastic responsibility, since they would categorically fail the 
ownership condition.  
 But this is the wrong result. It also threatens to make doxastic responsibility 
culturally relativistic. If, after sustained observation and interaction, we became confident 
that members of such a society indeed had beliefs, and that they understood themselves as 
having belief-like mental states, it’s far from obvious that we would not be entitled to hold 
them responsible for their beliefs. There might be a sense in which holding members of this 
society responsible for their beliefs would seem ‘unfair’, given that they would likely lack an 
understanding of the concept of doxastic responsibility. But if they understood the general 
concept of normative responsibility (e.g., as applied to actions), attributing doxastic 
responsibility to them would not be inappropriate, at least certainly not in principle.  
3.4. McCormick’s Reply  
The above three cases strongly suggest that McCormick’s ownership condition on 
guidance control is too strong. However, McCormick anticipates and responds to something 
like this objection. I will quote her at length so as not to obscure any of the details of her 
response:  
Another worry with the ownership account is that on the one hand, it can be too 
easy to duck responsibility by refusing to take responsibility and, on the other hand, 
one can be held responsible when one ought not to be because one has mistakenly 
taken responsibility. Should responsibility really depend on attitudes of the fallible 
agent? Fischer and Ravizza discuss this worry at length and I am satisfied with their 
response. First, we must remember the dialogical and historical aspects of their 
account. As I emphasized [above], taking responsibility is not a single act that one 
chooses to do or fails to choose to do. The price of failing to take responsibility is 
high and not one that many people would be willing to incur. In viewing oneself as 
an agent and as an “appropriate participant in the family of reactive attitudes,” one 
thereby takes responsibility. If one does not see oneself in such a way, one would be 
cut off from most meaningful human relationships; it requires one “to relinquish 
autonomy and to remain a fragmented self that is constantly in danger of ‘slipping 
away.’” There is, indeed, a “subjectivist” component to the ownership account in 
that an agent has to have a certain view of himself to be responsible.13 
 
                                               
13 McCormick (2015, pg. 121).  
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I think this response falls short of really addressing the most persistent form of the worry. 
McCormick suggests that the “price” of refusing to take responsibility for one’s beliefs is so 
high and thus “not one that many” people would accept. But if “not many” would pay this 
price, does she mean to allow that some would? Or even at least that some could choose to pay 
the price? If so, then McCormick has granted the existence of counterexamples to her 
account. If some agents could and/or would be willing to pay the price associated with 
refusing to taking responsibility for their beliefs, then those agents would effectively be able 
to exempt themselves from doxastic responsibility. But as I’ve suggested above, this appears 
implausible. It appears that agents can be proper targets for attributions of doxastic 
responsibility, in principle, regardless of whether they regard themselves as such, or whether 
they exercise guidance control.14 The fact that there is a “high price” associated with 
“ducking” responsibility by refusing to take ownership is ultimately neither here nor there in 
terms of addressing the worry at its most general level. 
 It is important to note that McCormick does allow that there might be exceptional 
cases, like the three I considered above, that may not appear to be fully captured by her 
account. However, if there are exceptional cases or potential counterexamples to a general 
account of a phenomenon, we want something principled to say about them. McCormick 
does have something to say, which is that in many such cases, failing to participate in the 
“family of reactive attitudes” would cut one off from most meaningful human relationships. 
And further, “it requires one ‘to relinquish autonomy and to remain a fragmented self that is 
constantly in danger of ‘slipping away.’”15 Relinquishing autonomy would likely mean that 
one does not qualify as enough of a rational agent to be appropriately held doxastically 
responsible, and so the cases then would be captured by her account. This response will 
capture some such cases, perhaps including Doxastic Swampman. But it’s far from clear that 
this response will work for Replicated Belief and Isolated Society. I think we can plausibly imagine 
that the citizens of the isolated society are autonomous, non-fragmented agents with various 
meaningful human relationships. And even though Jane, in Replicated Belief, can’t technically 
take ownership of her beliefs (given their origin), she nevertheless remains an autonomous 
agent capable of meaningful relationships. So while McCormick may allow that there are 
likely exceptional cases like these, more needs to be said about them and what they imply 
about the nature of doxastic responsibility. 
 
4. Doxastic Responsibility without Guidance Control: On Weak Doxastic Ownership 
I have now offered various criticisms and three counterexamples to McCormick’s 
account. The main upshot has been that agents can lack guidance control by failing the 
ownership condition, and yet still appear to be appropriate subjects of doxastic 
responsibility. However, I nevertheless think that some version of the notion of ownership of 
                                               
14 In the case of Replicated Beliefs, Jane presumably still regards herself as the proper subject of doxastic 
responsibility, so it may appear that McCormick’s approach can account for this case. But if it is a necessary for 
guidance control that one’s beliefs be produced by a mechanism that one has historically taken ownership of, 
Jane will fail this condition, and so will fail to exhibit guidance control.  
15 McCormick (2015, pg. 121). 
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belief is normatively central to doxastic responsibility. I thus now want to argue that a 
modified conception of ownership of belief (hereafter: doxastic ownership) can do important 
normative work in grounding responsibility for belief without being subsumed under or 
analyzed in terms of the notion of doxastic control, as McCormick does. I will call this 
modified conception Weak Doxastic Ownership. I call it “weak” only in a contrastive sense, in 
order to highlight that it is less demanding than McCormick’s conception of doxastic 
ownership.  
On the account I will develop in this section, the most fundamental form of doxastic 
responsibility--answerability--follows from the nature of belief itself, or rather, from what it is 
to hold a belief. So what makes one answerable (i.e., responsible) for one’s beliefs is just that 
one holds them. What this requires in the first instance is that one satisfy an attributability 
condition with respect to the beliefs--namely, that the beliefs are properly understood as one’s 
own in the normatively robust sense relevant to responsibility. This sense of a belief being 
‘one’s own’ is where the notion of doxastic ownership will play a central role: what it is for a 
belief to be properly attributable to an agent will be for her to satisfy the condition of weak 
doxastic ownership. The sense of doxastic ownership that I am interested in is the following: 
 
Weak Doxastic Ownership (WDO): An agent takes weak doxastic ownership of a 
doxastic attitude just in case she holds it for reasons she takes or is disposed to take 
herself to possess, and the attitude reflects an evaluative judgment that she regards or 
is disposed to regard as her own, i.e., she is disposed to reflectively endorse it as 
expressing her values. 
 
The most obvious and salient kind of evaluative judgment that a belief might reflect is a 
judgment about what a body of evidence supports, or more generally, what a body of 
reasons supports. An agent’s belief that p will presumably often reflect her (dispositional) 
evaluative judgment that the available evidence (or some body of evidence E) sufficiently supports believing 
that p. Alternatively, if one holds that we can believe for non-evidential reasons, as 
McCormick does, the relevant judgment might just be my available normative reasons sufficiently 
support believing that p, where some or all of these reasons might be non-evidential ones.16 
 However one may object that my characterization of WDO has the following 
problem: it will fail to capture cases in which agents believe for no reason.17 If WDO is a 
condition on doxastic responsibility, the objection goes, then it will tell us that agents who 
hold beliefs not based on reasons are exempted from responsibility, but this is plainly 
incorrect. This is indeed a worry for WDO, but it can be defused. I think it is in fact very 
unusual for agents not to believe for reasons that they are not disposed to take themselves to 
possess. This is compatible with thinking that, e.g., perceptual beliefs are not initially formed 
                                               
16 See also McCormick’s more recent (2018) for the issue of believing for non-evidential reasons.  
17 One might think, for example, that perceptual beliefs are ones that we do not form of hold for reasons, but 
rather are form and justified by (typically reliable) causal processes. But this is compatible with thinking that 
doxastic responsibility is a matter of the connection between one’s beliefs and one’s reasons, even if perceptual 
justification or warrant is not to be understood in terms of reasons. More would need to be said here, however, if 
e.g., one holds that justification is a necessary condition on doxastic responsibility, or vice versa. My point is 
merely that it appears plausible that justification and responsibility can come apart at at least one level.  
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and held for reasons. I think when we talk about agents believing ‘for no reason’, what we 
typically mean is no good or salient reason, or perhaps no immediately identifiable reason. But 
those kinds of cases are capturable by WDO. On the other hand, if there are in fact cases 
where an agent actually holds a belief not based in any way on what she is disposed to see as 
her reasons, I suspect one of two things will be true: the attitude in question will in fact not 
be a belief at all, or the agent will be alienated from the belief in such a way that it in fact will 
be appropriate to exempt her from responsibility for it.  
 To return, I propose to understand WDO as a kind of attributability condition: 
satisfying WDO with respect to a doxastic attitude makes that attitude one’s own in the 
normatively robust sense relevant to responsibility. Call this normative attributability. WDO is 
partly supposed to account for cases where a belief doesn’t seem to be attributable to an 
agent in the way that would legitimate attributions of responsibility. For example, beliefs that 
are ‘implanted’ via posthypnotic suggestion or brainwashing will likely not be connected with 
an agent’s judgments, values, and dispositions in the way that would satisfy WDO.18 In such 
cases, though these beliefs might ‘belong’ to the agent in the mere sense that they inhere in 
her psychology--call this descriptive attributability--they are not normatively attributable to her. 
 I next want to return to my remark above that doxastic responsibility follows from 
the nature of belief itself. My central suggestion here is that belief itself implies a norm of 
answerability, where this is the norm that effectively makes one the apt target of a demand 
for reasons or justification. That is, the holding of a belief by default makes one answerable 
for that belief. The intuitive justification for this claim is that if someone e.g., professes to 
believe that p, it always is apt (if not appropriate) to ask them why.19 Remember that if an agent 
satisfies WDO with respect to a belief--the belief is normatively attributable to her--then she 
sees or is disposed to understand that belief as held for or supported by her reasons. So the 
suggestion here is that belief is characterized by a norm of answerability that makes one 
answerable for one’s belief in relation to the reasons by which one (partly) satisfies WDO. 
 The claim that belief intrinsically implies a norm of answerability is likely a 
contentious one. However, one might take the claim to follow from some version of 
normativism about belief, namely, the view that belief is intrinsically subject to certain norms 
and/or evaluative standards, or that certain norms are ‘built into’ belief.20 For example, 
Pamela Hieronymi (2008) appears to take a norm of answerability to follow from something 
like normativism. She says, “believing brings with it its own distinctive form of answerability. 
In believing, you are answerable for reasons that you take to show the belief true.”21 For 
Hieronymi, this is in large part because beliefs are uniquely justified or rationalized by 
“constitutive reasons,” i.e., reasons bearing on the truth of their content. However, one 
could adopt an answerability norm even if one is an epistemic pragmatist (like McCormick), 
                                               
18 See Smith (2005) for a helpful discussion of these kinds of ‘implantation’ cases.  
19 By ‘apt’ I mean that it is never a category mistake to ask for someone’s reasons for belief, in the way it would 
be a mistake to ask for their reasons for their muscle spasm. But this does not mean it will always be appropriate 
to query someone’s reasons, e.g., it would likely be inappropriate to interrupt someone’s important speech or to 
break into their home in order to demand their reasons.  
20 See Nolfi (2015) for a recent discussion and defense of normativism. See also McHugh & Whiting (2014) for 
a general discussion of the view. 
21 Hieronymi (2008: 365).  
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where the norm would be that one is answerable for reasons that one takes to support 
holding or adopting one’s belief, not merely reasons that show the belief to be true. Thus, an 
answerability norm is in principle neutral between pragmatism and, e.g., evidentialism or 
‘truth-essentialism’ about belief.   
 The view I’m developing here may sound similar enough to Hieronymi’s that one 
might wonder whether I’m really offering anything new. However, her view is in fact quite 
different from my own. While Hieronymi does think that a norm of answerability is intrinsic 
to belief, what really does most of the work of making an agent the proper subject of 
doxastic responsibility for her is the notion of evaluative control.22 Evaluative control is a non-
voluntary, reasons-responsive form of doxastic control by which we ‘control’ our beliefs by 
evaluating the truth of their content. Evaluative control is effectively a form of doxastic 
deliberation by which we settle on our beliefs as the answers to questions about what is the 
case. By exercising evaluative control over our beliefs, Hieronymi holds, we make them 
constitutive parts of our “moral personality,” and they thereby reveal something deep about 
our characters, our rational selves, or the “quality of our will.” So, on her view, doxastic 
responsibility ends up being a species of, or at least grounded in, responsibility for self.23 So 
Hieronymi’s account is still fundamentally based on the notion of doxastic control, albeit a 
rather idiosyncratic one. The account I am offering here, on the other hand, is concerned 
with neither doxastic control nor responsibility for character or self, and so is importantly 
distinct.24  
 At this point, it may seem as though I’ve partly lost sight of the important normative 
role that doxastic ownership was supposed to play in grounding doxastic responsibility, and 
that the proposed answerability norm of belief has taken center stage. However, while 
answerability is indeed essential to my account, doxastic ownership still does the most 
fundamental normative work of making our beliefs ours in the way that allows for the 
answerability norm to apply. We can only be answerable for beliefs that are normatively 
attributable to us, and this is why, I suggest, the notion of doxastic ownership is essential. 
The nature of weak doxastic ownership as characterized above also helps make sense of why 
being responsible for a belief is a matter of being answerable to a demand from others for 
reasons in support of that belief.  
To summarize and conclude this section: I’ve now argued that the notion of doxastic 
ownership can do significant normative work in an account of doxastic responsibility without 
appeal to the notion of doxastic control. Belief essentially implies a norm of answerability, but 
it is doxastic ownership that makes us proper subjects of this norm. The final upshot of the 
account I’ve offered is that we are responsible for our beliefs not because (and when) we 
exercise control over them, but rather because (and when) we own them in the way discussed 
above. This helps us see why the agents in Replicated Belief, Doxastic Swampman, and Isolated 
                                               
22 See Hieronymi (2006, 2008). 
23 McCormick (2015) has raised various compelling criticisms of such ‘character-based’ views of doxastic 
responsibility.  
24 There is more that deserves to be said about the relation between my own view and Hieronymi’s. There are 
no doubt certain ways in which the views are importantly similar. But devoting more time to this issue is 
beyond the immediate scope of this paper. I hope to return to it at a later time.  
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Society might lack guidance control but nevertheless be proper subjects of doxastic 
responsibility. Insofar as the agents in those cases are capable of believing for reasons they 
see as evidence, and of making and endorsing evaluative judgements, it appears that they all 
can satisfy the weak ownership condition I’ve articulated despite lacking guidance control. 
 
5. Objections and Replies 
5.1. The Objection from Control, Take 1: Ownership Requires Control 
 I now want to consider some objections to the account I’ve offered. The first salient 
objection one may raise is that, even if we grant that a form of doxastic responsibility is 
implied by the nature of belief itself, doxastic ownership requires or involves a form of 
control. So one does not count as owning a belief unless one (can) exercise a form of control 
over it. Thus, doxastic responsibility cannot be divorced from doxastic control, the objection 
goes, even if such responsibility is grounded in doxastic ownership and the normativity of 
belief.  
The plausibility of this objection will depend heavily on what form of doxastic 
‘control’ one thinks is essential to ownership. Conceptions of doxastic control vary so widely 
that some versions of the objection will look significantly different from others.25 This is 
made more difficult by the fact that some things that get called ‘control’ don’t seem to 
involve much more than reasons-responsiveness (or, e.g., for Angela Smith, judgment-
sensitivity).26 Thus, there is the danger of getting caught up in a potentially merely verbal 
debate here regarding what does or doesn’t count as a form of doxastic ‘control.’ However, 
if one thinks that the relevant form of control is something like indirect voluntary control, 
whereby we can voluntarily alter our beliefs by e.g., gathering further evidence, it is 
implausible to think that this is required for ownership. This is because it is clear that a belief 
can be normatively attributable to us even when we are unable to exercise indirect voluntary 
control over the attitude. An agent can satisfy weak doxastic ownership even when there is 
simply no further evidence to gather regarding whether p, or when she is otherwise unable to 
exercise “managerial” or “manipulative” indirect doxastic control.27 For example, Kate might 
believe that extraterrestrials have visited Earth, but lack indirect voluntary control over her 
belief because she is totally unsure of what evidence, if any, would or might change her 
mind.28 Similarly, a lack of indirect voluntary control does not keep us from believing on the 
basis of reasons that we take to support our belief. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to argue that no version of doxastic ‘control’ is 
required for doxastic responsibility, given the aforementioned diversity and plurality of the 
various conceptions. For forms of ‘doxastic control’ that involve only some form of reasons-
responsiveness, it may be that such a capacity is required by my conception of doxastic 
ownership, but I think it is far from clear that such capacities really count as forms of 
                                               
25 E.g., Boyle’s (2009) “intrinsic control,” Hieronymi’s (2006, 2008) “evaluative control,” McCormick’s (2011, 
2015) “guidance control,” McHugh’s (2015) “attitudinal control,” and Smith’s (2005, 2008) “rational control.” 
See also Levy (2007) for a discussion of “dual control.” 
26 See Smith (2005, 2015a). 
27 See, e.g., Hieronymi (2006).  
28 See Peels (2017, Section 2.5) for a helpful discussion of the issues with indirect doxastic control.  
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‘control’. However, this rather quickly leads into what looks like a merely verbal dispute, and 
so I will not linger on the issue here. My point here has just been that doxastic ownership 
does not plausibly require or essentially involve the capacity to intentionally alter our beliefs.  
5.2. The Objection from Control, Take 2: Responsibility Requires Agency  
One may next have the following worry: one can only be held responsible for 
exercises of one’s agency, or the results of such exercises. But if answerability is a form of 
responsibility, how are we to understand the way in which it is connected to one’s agency? 
Typically, exercises of agency are understood as or in terms of exercises of control; thus, the 
motivation for grounding doxastic responsibility in some form of doxastic control. But if it 
is not ‘control’ that allows for the connection with agency, then what? 
In response, I want to suggest that believing itself can be understood as agential. To 
believe in the way that human animals do implies the employment of rational capacities that 
make possible believing for reasons. This is arguably why answerability follows from the nature 
of (human) belief itself: it represents an exercise of cognitive agency. Here I am inspired by 
Matthew Boyle’s (2009, 2011) view of doxastic agency, according to which belief implies 
“the activity of reason” and involves the actualization of rational capacities.29 While belief is 
a state of an agent, Boyle suggests it is an active state: it reflects a kind of continuous rational 
activity on the part of the doxastic agent.30 Boyle’s suggestion is that belief is not best 
understood merely as a passive state towards which we bear a non-agential relation unless it 
is through the extrinsic activities of deliberation and judgment. Rather than being exercised 
only in events or processes of coming to believe, our doxastic agency might also be exercised in 
“‘energetic’ activities of holding rationally-grounded attitudes toward particular 
propositions.”31 
However, Boyle’s view faces the following problems. Boyle suggests that belief is 
active in the sense that it represents something like the continuous assent to or acceptance of 
a proposition as something to-be-believed in light of one’s reasons, or the “enduring 
actualization of [an agent’s] capacity to hold a proposition true for a reason she deems 
adequate.”32 But “continuous assent” or “continuous acceptance” only seem to be notably 
active when they are understood as occurrent mental acts. Presumably acceptance, and 
perhaps also assent, can be non-occurrent mental states, but it is not clear that they make 
                                               
29 McCormick (2018) has recently discussed and defended Boyle’s view. While she does not appear to endorse 
it wholesale, she seems to prefer it over the alternatives, e.g., Chrisman’s (2018) view.  
30 Boyle employs Aristotle’s distinction between two kinds of actualization of a capacity. The first is kinēsis, 
which is taken to apply to any actualization of something’s capacity to change in respect of place, quality, or 
quantity. The second kind is energeia (often translated as “activity” or “actuality”) which is an actualization of a 
capacity “whose existence does not consist in the unfolding of a process proceeding towards a certain result, 
but rather in a mode of active being, every moment of whose existence constitutes a moment of the 
completion of this activity” (2011, 20). Belief, like knowledge and perception, is supposed to fall into the latter 
category. 
31 Boyle (2011, 21).  
32 Boyle (2011, 22). In his (2009), Boyle often speaks in terms of “assent,” but in his (2011), he speaks more in 
terms of “acceptance.” Assent and acceptance are sometimes treated as closely related or even interchangeable 
when directed at a proposition, but it is hard to know if Boyle treats them as such.  
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belief active in a robust sense when they are non-occurrent.33 Furthermore, it’s not clear that 
all forms of belief involve anything like continuous assent or acceptance. This means that 
many of our beliefs, especially our dormant, tacit, and dispositional beliefs, will come out as 
non-agential even for Boyle. So the sense in which belief is supposed to be a ‘continuous 
rational activity’ is not clearly captured by continuous assent or acceptance. 
Nevertheless, we can still capture the way in which belief is unique and interesting 
qua state without having to say that it involves a continuous activity in Boyle’s sense. I think 
Boyle is right to emphasize the way in which belief seems to involve a kind of continuous 
rational feature or a form of rationally important continuity. Belief is unlike other states in 
that it essentially involves a kind of temporal or synchronic stability. One can go from the state of 
being seated to that of being standing and back again in seconds. But belief isn’t like this: 
part of being in a state of belief is that that state extends over time in a certain way. This is 
what, e.g., makes it a state of belief and not merely a state of one’s brain at a particular time. 
But what is this sense in which belief is essentially diachronic? I want to suggest that the 
state of belief is sustained over time by our doxastic agency, e.g., our counterfactual sensitivity 
to various considerations as normative reasons. This need not be understood in terms of 
continuous assent or acceptance, but rather only our persistent counterfactual sensitivity to 
considerations bearing on the truth or falsity of our beliefs.34 This explains why belief states 
can’t simply go in and out of existence: their continuous and synchronic stability reflects the 
continuity of the perceived normative force of various reasons by the agent. Finally, the idea 
would be that states that represent our enduring rational sensitivity to reasons, like belief, 
and so exhibit this kind of stability and continuity are subject to certain norms, e.g., a norm 
of answerability.  
The view that belief itself is agential is highly contentious. I am unable to defend it 
fully here, but I do think it helps us to understand three things. First, it helps us see why the 
locus of doxastic agency, and thus also doxastic responsibility, could be belief or believing itself, 
and not merely things extrinsic to belief, such as belief-system maintenance (see Chrisman 
2018) or practices of indirect doxastic influence (see Peels 2017).35 Second, the view helps us 
see why some version of normativism might be true: belief is intrinsically subject to certain 
norms in part because believing is an exercise of rational agency. And finally, for the same 
reasons, it can help us see why one of these norms intrinsic to belief might be a norm of 
answerability: namely, because we are answerable for the exercises our agency.  
5.3. Objection 3: The Present Account is Too Liberal   
The third objection I’d like to consider is that the account I’ve offered is too liberal, 
and so will imply that agents are responsible for their beliefs in a range of cases in which it is 
implausible to ascribe such responsibility, such as for young children, or cases where an 
                                               
33 This, of course, it precisely the kind of reasoning that Boyle is challenging and rejecting. And while I am 
largely sympathetic to his account, I think there is more to be said about whether ‘active’ and ‘activity’ are the 
right conceptual categories. 
34 So while Boyle seems to want to think in terms of the continuous operation or actualization of our rational 
capacities in a way that makes belief “active,” it seems we need only think in terms of the persistent sensitivity 
of our rational capacities to being called into operation.  
35 As McCormick (2018: 643) has recently point out, sometimes we want to say “‘Be a better believer’, not ‘Be a 
better belief-system maintainer.’”  
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agent has been brainwashed into holding a belief, or where the belief has otherwise been 
‘implanted’ in some unusual manner. In such cases, the objection goes, my account will tell 
us that the agents are still responsible for the implanted beliefs, since this follows simply 
from the fact that their beliefs are attributable to them--and this is the wrong result. The 
correct thing to say is that such agents are excused from responsibility, since their beliefs are 
the products of force, manipulation, or--in the case of young children--insufficiently rational 
processes.36  
 This objection points to an important worry, but it can be accommodated by my 
account. It is true that any theory of responsibility, doxastic or otherwise, will need to have 
something to say about how excuses and exemptions from responsibility function. But the 
account I’ve offered can allow that agents in the above kinds of cases may be excused from 
responsibility in one of two different senses. The initial question here is whether implanted 
beliefs, or a young child’s beliefs, would really be normatively attributable to the relevant 
agent. While, e.g., a brainwashed agent’s implanted beliefs may be descriptively attributable 
to her, if the beliefs are not normatively attributable to her, then she would not be subject to 
the answerability norm of belief, and thus would not be responsible. So some of the 
potential problem cases identified by the objection will be accommodated by the fact that 
the relevant beliefs will not be normatively attributable to the agents.  
However, it is perhaps possible that some brainwashed agents, or young children, 
will satisfy doxastic ownership with respect to some of their beliefs. But here we can separate 
responsibility (i.e., answerability) simpliciter from praise and blame, or from negative and 
positive epistemic appraisal.37 One can be excused from praise or blame without being 
excused from answerability itself. If an agent’s beliefs are the result of brainwashing or 
implantation, we might excuse her from, e.g., blame for failing to satisfactorily respond to a 
demand for reasons. That is, we might excuse them from being negatively evaluated for 
failing to have good reasons for their beliefs. The same might be said about the case of 
young children. But this is compatible with such agents nonetheless remaining responsible 
qua answerable. So, while default doxastic responsibility, in the form of answerability, will 
apply as long as one’s beliefs are normatively attributable to one, this does not imply that 
one will always be blameworthy for, e.g., irrational or false beliefs. Holding that one might be 
excused from epistemic blame or praise by contingent factors is perfectly compatible with 
the claim that doxastic responsibility is implied by the nature of belief itself and by doxastic 
ownership. 
So, on my account, excuses from responsibility will function not at the level of 
answerability or ownership itself, but at the level at which one’s rational performance in 
response to the demands associated with answerability is evaluated. Thus, if the brainwashed 
agent, or the child, can properly be said to own their beliefs in the sense of normative 
                                               
36 Smith (2005) discusses these kinds of ‘implantation’ cases in the context of attitudinal responsibility, and 
concludes that in most such cases, agents would be excused from responsibility for ‘implanted’ attitudes, since 
they would likely fail to appropriately reflects the agents’ evaluative judgments. 
37 The distinction between responsibility as such and praise or blame, or negative and positive appraisal, has 
been discussed in the ethics literature. E.g., see Calhoun (1989) and Smith (2008). Some have also brought a 
version the distinction to bear in discussions of specifically doxastic responsibility, e.g., Peels’ (2017) distinction 
between praise, blame, and “neutral appraisal.”  
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attributability, they will thereby be subject to the answerability norm of belief. So they are 
not excused from responsibility simpliciter. Rather, they are potentially excused from blame 
for failing to meet the rational demands of answerability, assuming they indeed fail.38 Much 
more would need to be said here, ideally, about the nature of doxastic praise and blame. My 
account in this paper has not been of praise and blame, but rather of the basic form, 
structure, and ground of doxastic responsibility.39 
 
6. Conclusion  
I’ve done two things in this paper. First, I’ve offered three cases about which 
McCormick’s view that doxastic responsibility entails guidance control appears to give the 
wrong result. The cases have shown three different ways that agents can fail to satisfy 
McCormick’s ownership condition of guidance control, but still seem to be proper subjects 
of doxastic responsibility. Thus, the sense of ‘ownership of belief’ required by McCormick’s 
account of guidance control is, I’ve argued, too strong.  
Second, I’ve developed a modified conception of doxastic ownership, which I’ve 
called Weak Doxastic Ownership. I’ve proposed understanding this form of doxastic ownership 
as a condition of normative attributability, the satisfaction of which makes an agent’s belief(s) 
‘their own’ in the sense relevant to responsibility. I’ve also suggested that belief is intrinsically 
subject to a norm of answerability, such that if one satisfies the doxastic ownership 
condition, one is thereby subject to this norm, and so is answerable for the relevant belief(s). 
The final upshot of the account I’ve offered is that doxastic responsibility is not grounded 
in, nor does it require, doxastic control, but rather follows partly from the nature of belief 
itself, and from the way in which we typically own our beliefs in a normatively robust fashion. 
I would like to conclude by briefly considering some of the advantages of my 
account, at least as compared to McCormick’s. The first is that, as already noted, it allows us 
to see why the agents in Replicated Belief, Doxastic Swampman, and Isolated Society could be 
proper subjects of doxastic responsibility despite lacking guidance control. This points to a 
second, broader advantage, namely that my account allows us to make sense of a range of 
unusual kinds of cases without having to say that the agents in such cases suffer from 
fragmented identity or diminished agency. This is due in part to a third advantage, which is 
that my account allows us to separate responsibility from blame and praise: agents can be 
excused from negative or positive epistemic evaluation without thereby being excused from 
doxastic responsibility itself. Finally, my account, if correct, allows us to reorient the debate 
                                               
38 One might, however, have lingering worries like the following: we can imagine an evil neuroscientist who is 
able to manipulate a person’s brain so that, not only are new beliefs implanted, but also so that those beliefs are 
connected with the person’s reasons, values, judgments, and dispositions such that the person satisfies the 
doxastic ownership condition. In such a case, one might object that the person is not even responsible qua 
answerable for the beliefs, much less epistemically blameworthy. However, I suggest that what is 
counterintuitive about such cases is not the idea that the person remains answerable for the implanted beliefs 
(assuming she is still a rational agent after the procedure), but that it is the same person as before. Rather, if the 
person’s values and dispositions were radically altered all at once by such a procedure, it would be a new person 
who is answerable for the implanted beliefs. And so our (mistaken) presumption that it would be the original 
person who is answerable for the new, implanted beliefs is, I think, what seems most counterintuitive.  
39 While giving an account of doxastic praise and blame is beyond the scope of this paper, it is clearly important 
and directly relevant, and so I hope to return to the issues at a later time. 
  
Forthcoming in Episteme                        16 
over doxastic responsibility away from the issue of doxastic control--and thus potentially away 
from worries surrounding doxastic involuntarism--and towards issues of doxastic ownership 
and the normativity of belief. 
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